Income Taxation Devices Applied to the Decedent, His Estate and His Successors by Boehm, R. T.
DEATH AND TAXES - 1
INCOME TAXATION DEVICES APPLIED TO THE
DECEDENT, HIS ESTATE AND HIS
SUCCESSORS
R. T. BoHIm.*
Distinctions which originated in a feudal economy
when land dominated social relations are peculiarly irrele-
vant in the applications of tax measures now so largely
directed toward intangible wealth.
MR. JUsTIcE FRAaNxuRTER*
INTRODUCTION
Devolution of property to a decedent's successors follows three
principal patterns: the simplest is based upon centuries of ecclesiastical
probate administration; a second major category is rooted in ancient
feudal real estate patterns; and a third basic variety originated in
newer, direct designation arrangements largely based on contract.'
These existent methods are the end products of three diverse histories
undergirding the major property doctrines in the systems of state
law.2 On their differing results has been superimposed an effective
federal method of taxing successors on the passage of property
values.3
Even though the taxing system works reasonably well in assessing
estate tax cost against all three types of transmission of economic
value, the locus of the burden of the payment of the tax cost seems in-
equitable in some applications because of persisting rules traceable to
the historical origins out of which the system arose.4 This inequity is
the fault of the federal taxing system only by indirection; it has ac-
* Partner, Boehm & Rance, Attorneys at Law, Columbus, Ohio; Lecturer in Law,
College of Law, The Ohio State University.
** Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 451, 23 Am. Fed. Tax Rev. 1054, 1061, 40-1
U.S.T.C. ff 9208 (1940). "[Ellusive and subtle casuistries . . . may have their
historic justification but possess no relevance for tax purposes .... (They] derive from
medieval concepts .... " The Supreme Court refuses "to subordinate the plain purposes
of a modern fiscal measure to the wholly unrelated origins of the recondite learning of
ancient property law."
1 This treatment is essentially an extension and correlated continuation into the
income tax field of "Death & Taxes I," 22 Ohio St. L.J. 327 (1961). Many references
here have been developed in that portion which ought to be imported here.
2 "Death & Taxes I," supra page 328 notes 5 through 7.
3 That the Federal estate taxing system is largely effective as to the scope of its
definitional includibillty we noticed in Death & Taxes I, in the text supra at note 55.
4 See "Death and Taxes I," Table 1 supra page 330.
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cepted uncritically a partially defective method for the imposition of
the burdens of estate taxes against successions determined according
to local law.'
The federal income tax method seeks to trace net taxable income
to somebody, irrespective of the fact of the taxpayer's demise. The
fact of death ought neither to reduce nor increase the income tax
cost. The decedent's passing ought not to cause loss of deductions
unclaimed for income tax purposes. Practical tax effect ought to be
accorded to the related deductions which result from death. These
objectives are accomplished through technical concept known as income
in respect of a decedent, and its counterpart in deductibility. It is
supplemented by the newer distributive net income technique and
termination deductions. All of these are used to pass these results to
various taxpayer persons.
INCOME TAX RETURNS OF THE DECEDENT AND His SuRvIviNG SPOUSE
The last income tax return of the decedent ends at the date of
his death6 and must include all of the taxable income taxable to that
time7 and the deductibles paid until then. The decedent's return may
be filed jointly with the surviving spouse at her option' if she has not
remarried,9 but the executor may disaffirm.'0 The spouse can refuse
to join in the joint return in the presence of potential income tax
liabilities of the decedent with inadequate probate assets out of which
to pay the joint debt" created by the election to file jointly.12 A
fiduciary was ordered to join with the surviving spouse in executing a
joint return in order to save income taxes through the income-split.' 3
G See "Death & Taxes I" smpra, cases cited at notes 5-8; notes 89-95; note 97.
6 Treas. Reg § 1.451-1(b)(i) (1957).
7 The cash method of accounting also includes all items constructively received under
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957), even though not actually paid after death.
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013(a) (3) permits a joint return by the surviving
spouse if no fiduciary has been appointed by the due date of the return.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-1(d)(3) (1959).
10 The executor may disaffirm within 1 year from the due date. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 6013(a) (3) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-1(d) (2) (1959).
11 Joint liability is a matter of intention and ought to be rejected if a debt will
be credited with no probate assets out of which to pay. Consider the narrow escape of
Eva M. Manton, 11 T.C. 831 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 3 as the result of the
machinations of Circuit Judge Martin Manton reflected in Manton v. United States,
107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664 (1938).
12 The unpaid income tax liability of the decedent is a claim against the probate
estate. See "Death and Taxes I," supra notes 80-81. It may not be against the non-
probate assets. Comm'r v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1899, 58-2 U.S.T.C.
ff 9594 (1958); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1904, 58-2
U.S.T.C. if 9595 (1958).
13 Estate of Frank J. Floyd, 72 Pa. D. & C. 406, 43 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1301, 51-2
U.S.T.C. ff 9415 (Orphans' Ct. 1951).
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When the joint return is filed, the decedent's proportionate share of the
income tax liability 4 is a debt of the decedent;"m but conversely, the
amount withheld from salaries for payment to the government by
his employer, and payments on decedent's estimated income tax are
assets of the decedent's estate and includible for estate tax purposes
accordingly' 6
The last income tax return can include an optional special election
to accrue previously untaxed United States Treasury discount bond
interest even though the method had never before been elected by
the decedent.' This special option can be exercised for the decedent
in his last income tax return, or it can be elected by the estate or by
any successor, but the election must apply to all bonds owned. 8
Alternatively, the effect of partial election by the estate or by suc-
cessors can be accomplished by an actual redemption of the desired
amount; this will produce cash realization of the income for taxation.' 9
Medical expenses of the decedent paid within one year after
death can be deducted in his last return ° or deducted in the estate
tax return2' or deducted by the surviving spouse in the year of pay-
ment.22
The income tax returns of the surviving spouse for the two years
following death can use the income splitting rate method if she has
not remarried and if she maintains a household for a dependent.23
TRACING DECEDENT'S UNTAXED INcOME To HIS SUCCESSORS
A taxable income or deduction event must occur either in the
form of a cash receipt or payment, or as a taxable accrual of right or
offsetting liability. The requirement carries with it the possibility
that an item may have escaped the claims of the tax collector or the
right of the taxpayer before death. Add to this corpus-income concepts
from property law and their derivative argument-a right accrued at
death is a fixed property right-the income tax can only fall on
14 Proportionate allocation is required based on relative amounts of husband's in-
come and wife's income. Rev. Rul. 57-78, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 300.
35 Compare Mills v. United States, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6102, 59-2 U.S.T.C. if 11,894
(S.D. Ga. 1959).
16 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2033.
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 454(a) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.454-1(a) (1957).
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 454(a).
19 The same rule applies to any taxpayer; but successors are not required to accrue
because the earlier owner did so. Treas. Reg. § 1.454-1(a) (1957).
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(d) (1960), but double
deductions are not permissible. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 642(g).
21 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2053 (a) (3).
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(a) (3) (i) (1960).
23 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2(b).
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"incomes from whatever source derived." 24 Since the property right
transmitted at death is no longer income in the property sense, perhaps
it could not be taxed. Of course, the argument could not stand scru-
tiny: its fallacy lay in equating constitutional taxing power over in-
come with the probate and trust law category of income as a conceptual
method used in distributing property benefits."
Until 1934, no income tax was assessed against a decedent nor
against his successors." The rule was the opposite from 1934 until
1942: an income tax was assessed particularly because of death.1
7
This was unfair to the successors because of the extra income tax cost
it produced through the bunching effect in the last income tax return. 8
Since 1942, the new concept of income in respect of a decedent has
been the common standard,29 and by explicit statutory command, no
accruals of income result from death alone.
30
As originally enacted, the concept of income in respect of a dece-
dent was not defined. The administrative interpretation now applic-
able supplies some assistance in determining its meaning:
Income in respect of a decedent refers to those amounts to which
a decedent was entitled as gross income but which were not properly
includible in computing his taxable income for the taxable year
ending with the date of his death or for a previous taxable year
under the method of accounting employed by the decedent .. .
(including):
(1) All accrued income of a decedent who reported his income
by use of the cash receipts and disbursements method;
(2) Income accrued solely by reason of the decedent's death in
case of a decedent who reports his income by use of an
accrual method of accounting; and
(3) Income to which the decedent had a contingent claim at
the time of his death. 31
24 U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
25 Gifts and inheritances are ordinarily exempt from income taxation, but not if
the inheritance is an income right. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102(b). Income rights
actually become corpus at death under probate and trust law. Consider the effects of
this doctrine on the federal law of income taxation which was argued in Richardson v.
United States, 177 F. Supp. 394, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5642, 59-2 U.S.T.C. II 9712 (E.D.
Mich. 1959) (app. to 6th Cir. 1960).
26 Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R. 7101 (1927).
27 Helvering v. Enright's Estate, 312 U.S. 636, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1213, 41-1
U.S.T.C. TI 9356 (1941); Putman's Estate v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 393, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.
599, 45-1 U.S.T.C. fI 9234 (1945).
28 This bunching effect was particularly noticed in Comm'r v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1,
45 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1522, 54-1 U.S.T.C. U1 9384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871
(1954), noted in 33 Taxes 675 (1955), and in Lacomble v. United States, 177 F. Supp.
373, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5563, 59-2 U.S.T.C. TI 9692 (N.D. Calif. 1959).
29 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691.
30 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 451(b).
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-1(b) (1957).
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The courts have applied a broad test of includibility for the most
part: pregnant property which carries untaxed income rights derived
from the decedent is almost certainly taxable to the successors to
whom it devolves.2 Conversely, if the item in question could have
never been income to the decedent, it can not be income to his suc-
cessors. 3  The same generic concepts of income persist after death as
before; mere accretion of value unaccompanied by a taxable event
is not recognized as a taxable income factor. Thus a cash basis farmer
who has untaxed inventories of agricultural products on hand at death
is not subject to income tax at death on their value.34 But if there
is another event present, such as where he has set in motion the
marketing processes so that their crop status has been replaced by
unsatisfied obligations of payment by others, the untaxed profit is
income in respect of decedent.35 Increase in the value of corporate
shares arising from an enforceable buy-sell agreement entered into
during life will not be taxed as income to the sudcessors when the
redemption is accomplished., 6 Of course, if the stepped-up-basis-at-
death provisions of section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code apply,
there is no possibility of income in respect of decedent; the two con-
cepts are statutorily defined to be mutually exclusive."
The broad sweep of many decisions has seemed to find taxability
to successors arising out of a decedent's untaxed income in three
major areas:
(1) Almost all items of untaxed value based on a decedent's
personal services during his lifetime are later taxed to
somebody. An earlier difficulty in the method of taxing
partners post-mortem income has been clarified. 9 About
32 Estate of O'Daniel v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 966, 37 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1249, 49-1
U.S.T.C. ff 9235 (2d Cir. 1949); and see Estate of Riegelman v. Comm'r, 253 F.2d 315,
1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 2117, 58-1 U.S.T.C. II 11,753 (2d Cir. 1958) (right to post death
income from law partnership subject to income tax under Internal Revenue Code of
1954, § 691 is therefore an includible asset for estate tax purposes under Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, § 2031).
33 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-1(d) (1957); Rev. Rul. 59-64, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 31
(items excluded from includible income under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 105
retain this character in hands of successors).
34 Estate of Tom L. Burnett, 2 T.C. 897 (1943). This case applies equally under
current law. Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 366.
35 Comm'r v. Linde, supra note 28; Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2, examples (5) and (2)
(1957).
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), example (4) (1957).
37 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(c); compare Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 Cum.
Bull. 366.
38 See table 3-1 at 355, items I(a) through 1(m).
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I-ITEMS PRNCIPALLY BASED ON SERVICES
(a) Post-mortem salary payments by em-
ployer to the estate are decedent's
§ 691 income
(b) Non taxable payments in lieu of
salary are not taxable under § 691
(a) if they would not have been
taxable to the decedent by life-
time payment
(c) Gratuitous post-mortem payments up
to $5000 to a widow or successor
are not income in respect of dece-
dents under § 691(a)
(d) Gratuitous post-mortem payments to
a widow in excess of $5000 may or
may not be § 691 income
(e) Insurance renewals commission paid
after death are decedent's § 691
income
(f) Post-mortem payments for unused
leave time due to a government
employee are decedent's § 691
income
(g) Accounts receivable paid off after
death for services rendered are
usually decedent's § 691 income
(h) Contingent fees for services will be
decedent's § 691 income
(j) Income resulting from an employee's
restricted stock option which
passed from a decedent is dece-
dent's § 691 income
(k) Authors publication royalties paid
post-mortem are decedent's § 691
income
(m) Post-mortem payments to partners
for their earnings are now explicit-
ly covered by Internal Revenue
Code § 691(e)
AuTmno S AND Co-mwxs
PERFOPMMD DURING DECEDENT'S LuIrmr
Estate of Bausch v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d
313, 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 61 (2d Cir.
1951) (under Int. Rev. Code of 1939)
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a) -2(b), example
(1) (1957)
Rev. Rul. 59-64, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 31
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101 (b)
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-1(d) (1957)
See note 40 for the reflection of a long
struggle still continuing on this issue
Latendresse v. Comm'r, 243 F.2d 577, 51
Am. Fed. Tax R. 145 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 830 (1957); Treas.
Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) example (2) (1957)
Rev. Rul. 55-229, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 75.
See also I.T. 3801, 1946-1 Cum. Bull.
109
Dixon v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 986,
40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 563 (E.D. Ky.
1950), aff'd per ciar t, 192 F.2d 92
(6th Cir. 1951).
O'Daniels Estate v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d
966, 37 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1249 (2d Cir.
1949); Friedman, "Estate and Income
Tax Aspects of Fees Due at Death," 18
N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax. 1293 (1960).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 421(d)(6).
Rev. Rul. 57-544, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 361;
Rev. Rul. 60-227, 1960-1 Cum. Bull.
262; Sutter, "(Revenue) Ruling 60-227
clarifies income in respect of a decedent
arising from property," 14 Journal of
Taxation 214 (April, 1961).
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JuDicAL & ADMSTRATIV APPLICATIONS
DESCRIPTION OF
VALUES TRANSimITTED
AT DEATH AuTHORnS & CommMNTs
2-ITEMS PRINCIPALLY BASED ON INCOmE FROm TRADITIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(n) Dividends declared as of an ante-
mortem record date payable after
date of death are decedent's § 691
income when paid post-mortem
(p) Ante-mortem interest owed to the
decedent at death is decedent's § 691
income
(q) United States government bond in-
terest must be classified by type of
issue:
Untaxed ante-mortem interest from
Series E bonds can be decedent's
§ 691 income
[Consider the election to accrue E
bond interest in the last return of
the decedent: this will eliminate
§ 691(a) income]
Untaxed post-mortem interest on
G bonds not due until after death
is not includible as § 691(a) income
(r) Defaulted interest which originated
after purchase by decedent is
decedent's § 691 income, not return
of capital
(s) Promissory notes representing uncol-
lected rentals for periods before
death for cash basis taxpayer col-
lected after death by estate are
decedent's § 691 income
(t) Distributable net income from trusts
and estates accrued at date of death
payable at later date is decedent's
§ 691 income
(u) Income in respect of one or more
prior decedents is income in respect
to the instant decedent
(v) Accumulations in a building and loan
deposit account untaxed to the
decedent are income in respect of
decedent
(w) Alimony arrears payable to the wife's
estate is decedent's § 691 income
(x) Damage claims pending at death will
carry § 691 income if they would
have been taxable income items to
the decedent
(y) Post-mortem earning power of an
estate asset is not § 691 income;
thus interest on installment pay-
ments due for deceased partner's in-
terest is not decedent's § 691 income
since it did not arise prior to death
Putnams Estate v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 393,
33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 599 (1945) (before
§ 691 was enacted); compare Lowndes
& Kramer, "The Accrual of Corporate
Dividends Under The Federal Estate
Tax," 16 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 46 (1954).
Richardson v. United States, 177 F. Supp.
394, 4 Am. Fed Tax R.2d 5642 (E.D.
Mich. 1959) (app. to 6th Cir. 1960).
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), example (3)
(1957). Rev. Rul. 58-435, 1958-2 Cum.
Bull. 370.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 454(a).
Estate of Willis L. King, 18 T.C. 414
(1952), acq., 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 5.
Herbert Payson, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
686, 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 596 (1959).
Estate of Ostella Carruth, 28 T.C. 871
(1957).
Treas. Reg. § 1.652(c)-2 (1956); Treas.
Reg. § 1.662(c)-2 (1956).
Compare also Rev. Rul. 59-346, 1959-2
Cum. Bull. 165.
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-(c) (1957).
Rev. Rul. 57-544, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 361.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4(b)(1)
(1957). Edna S. Ullman, 34 T.C. No.
114 (1960).
Estate of William P. Cooper, 19 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 521, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
585 (1960) (app. 4th Cir. 1960).
Estate of Sarah L. Naraschkine, 14 T.C.
1128 (1950), aff'd per curiarn, 189 F.2d
257 (2d Cir. 1951).
Rev. Rul. 55-463, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 277.
Adele Trounstine, 18 T.C. 1233 (1952),
rev'd on other grounds, 213 F.2d 78,
46 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1782, 54-2 U.S.T.C.
ff 9359 (3d Cir. 1954).
Mandel v. Sturr, 266 F.2d 321, 3 Am. Fed.
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JuDiCIL & AnitrmTRsm~r APPLICATioNs
DEscRIPTIoN OF
VALUEs TRANs, TTED
AT DEATH AUTHORITIES & COMMENTS
3-INCO=E PRINCIPALLY BASED ON CAPITAL VALuS OR TRANSACTIONS WMlCH ORIGINATED
DuRIN THE Lnm= oF THE DECEDENT
(aa) Decedent's untaxed rights to instal-
ment payments for lifetime trans-
actions are decedent's § 691 income
(bb) Decedent's right to receive payment
for sales of his property:
Completed during his lifetime but
paid post-mortem are decedent's
§ 691 income
Set in motion during his lifetime
but not consummated are not de-
cedent's § 691 income
(cc) Cash basis farmers date of death
inventory is not income in respect
of decedent, thereby escapes income
taxation altogether
(dd) But when the decedent has set the
liquidation process into motion and
it is nearly complete, the profit is
decedent's income under § 691(a)
(ee) Unmatured crops are not decedent's
§ 691 income to anybody
(ff) Untaxed profit based upon an inter-
vivos redemption or sale agreement
exercisable only at death, but con-
summated post-mortem is not tax-
able income
(gg) Amounts received by a surviving
annuitant under a joint and survivor
annuity contract give rise to an
estate tax deduction for income tax
purposes
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(a)(4);
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-5 (1957).
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2,
example (4).
example (5)(1), (2) (1957).
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2,
example (5)(2) (1957).
Estate of Tom L. Burnett, 2 T.C. 897
(1943). Under § 1014(b), basis is stepped
up, therefore no income tax results at
sale at date of death value.
This rule is equally applicable under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 691
(a); Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 Cum. Bull.
366.
Comm'r v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 45 Am. Fed.
Tax. R. 1522, 54-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9384 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954),
noted in 33 Taxes 675 (1955).
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b),
example (5)(1) and example (5)(2)
(1957).
Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270,
1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 2028, 58-1 U.S.T.C.
ff 9400 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b),
example (4) (1957).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(d).
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the only real exception is the on-going dispute over treatment
of voluntary payments made by an employer to widows and
successors.
40
other type of entity. But for partnerships particularly, taxing theories in use until
1954 caused serious problems of bunching as a result of death. Here is how the question
might come up: the partners taxable year in which ended the ordinary partnership fiscal
year would include a 12 month period. If death occurred any time up to eleven months
later in the same taxable year for the partner, the partnership taxable year would again
come to an end and the second group of months would therefore fall into the same
return. This classical example is illustrated by the implications of Comm'r v. Estate of
Tyree, 215 F.2d 78, 45 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1872, 54-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9505 (10th Cir. 1954);
Grant v. Busey, 230 F.2d 290, 49 Am. Fed. Tax R. 227, 56-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9281 (6th Cir.
1956); consult also Weyler & Flom, "Death and Income Taxes-The Demise of a
Partner," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 695 (1952).
New statutory provisions now prevent the death of a partner from dosing his
taxable year. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 706(c) (1); see also Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 451(b). All post-mortem partnership income is now taxed as income in respect of
decedent under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 691. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 753,
736(a); see Repetti, "Death of a Partner," 13 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax. 921 (1955).
The partners income to date of death will also be an includible asset for estate tax
purposes. Estate of Riegelman v. Comm'r, supra note 32. The death benefit exemption
available to an employee under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 101(b) does not
apply to income paid to the widow of a partner. Mary Tighe, 33 T.C. 557, 567 (1959).
40 The long dispute over the various tax implications attending the payment of
voluntary consolatory disbursements to estates and widows of deceased employees shows
only a clouded future. Substantial fact differences have characterized a long continuing
struggle during which, until recently, the government often seemed sure to lose both
ways.
The employer has usually managed to sustain deduction for post-mortem payments
to employees. Consult among others, Nixon v. United States, 52 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1650,
57-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9982 (E.D. Tenn. 1957), appeal dismissed, (6th Cir. 1958); and Fifth
Avenue Coach Lines Inc., 31 T.C. 1080 (1959), modified on other issues, 281 F.2d 556,
6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5665, 60-2 U.S.T.C. 11 9628 (2d Cir. 1960), appealed to Supreme
Court January 7, 1961; Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income Gift & Estate Taxation
§ 14.13(4) (1951).
On the employees side, compensation paid by reason of an employer's contractual
obligation is taxable both as decedent's § 691 income and for estate tax purposes. Estate
of Riegelman v. Comm'r, 253 F.2d 318, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 2119, 58-1 U.S.T.C. ff 11,753
(2d Cir. 1958); Estate of O'Daniel v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 966, 37 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1249,
49-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9235 (2d Cir. 1949); Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958); Bilder, "Death
Benefits Paid Under an Express Contract," 34 Taxes 529 (1956); Note, 66 Yale L.J.
1217 (1957). Even in the absence of an explicit binding contract to do so, the long
continued conduct of some employers in this direction creates taxability as being the
practical equivalent of an express contract. Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497,
2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6036, 58-2 U.S.T.C. f 9923 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
944 (1959).
In the absence of an enforceable contract, it was hardly surprising that payments
made by the employer to the decedent's estate would be held to be income in respect
of decedent. Bausch v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 313, 40 Am. Fed. Tax R. 61, 51-1 U.S.T.C.
ff 9146 (2d Cir. 1951). This seems reasonable enough since the estate is the lineal legal
successor of the deceased employee himself.
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(2) Quite similar, the income thrown off by conventional prop-
erty holdings before the decedent's death but realized after
death are taxed somewhere when they have been reduced
Perhaps because the nexus between the employment and the widow seemed con-
siderably more tenuous when the estate was not present as the named beneficiary, gifts
to widows have been repeatedly held non-taxable for income tax purposes. Fathered
perhaps by some overly favorable early administrative rulings, a long series of disastrous
cases under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 produced a singularly unsuccessful litiga-
tion pattern. Louise K. Aprill, 13 T.C. 707 (1949), acq., 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 1, non acq.,
1957-2 Cum. Bull. 8. In 1958, the government announced abandonment of litigation of
cases which arose under the former code. Rev. Rul. 58-613, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 914.
The Revenue Service has been contending that since 1954, a new provision in In-
ternal Revenue Code, § 101(b)(2), changed the old rule. It has ruled that only $5,000
paid by reason of the death of the employee is income tax exempt, and that all over
that amount is taxable to the recipient as income. Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960 Int. Rev. Bull.
No. 42, at 11. This argument has met with both rejection and success. In the first direct
ruling under the new code, the payments were held non-taxable. United States v. Reed,
277 F.2d 456, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1141, 60-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9349 (6th Cir. 1960). Accord,
Cowan v. United States, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5499 (N.D. Ga. 1960). The government's
position has been accepted by the Tax Court in Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C.
No. 10 (1960) which rejected the Reed doctrine. Compare also United States v. Kasyn-
ski, 284 F.2d 143, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6060 (10th Cir. 1960) which appears to be in
accord with Reed but explicitly relied on significant fact differentials highlighted in
Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1629 (1960); see also
Richards, "Voluntary Payments to Widows or Beneficiaries of Deceased Employees,"
22 Ohio St. LJ. 318 (1961).
It may be begging the question to rely on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 102(b) which refuses gift treatment where the gift is income from property.
A revised approach by the government to measure deductibility by the employer
seems reasonable enough to require caution in laying out future conduct. The crucial
inquiry can be directed at the key search for the presence of an employer's obligation.
If there be a contract to pay a benefit at death, or conduct which approximates
it, the disbursement is plainly deductible assuming that the total compensation was
reasonable in amount. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 162(a), 212, 404(a); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.404(a)-1(b) (1956). Contrast with this the non-enforceable moral obligation rule:
payment of an unenforcible obligation is not deductible because payment of moral
obligations by businesses is not ordinary and not legally necessary. Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1456, 3 U.S.T.C. fI 1164 (1933). If payment of a
moral obligation is not ordinary and necessary, consider the weaker aspects of the
voluntary payment: how can a disbursement be ordinary and necessary where the
payment is made even though the employer has explicitly and totally repudiated any
obligation, legal or moral?
The standard corporate recitative format carefully drawn from the cases specifically
casts the payment in the nominal cloak of a gift. Sometimes it is stated to have been
engendered by pure donative intent or said to have been based upon affection. See
Comm'r v. Duberstein, supra.
To start afresh, doesn't a gift by definition fall short of meeting the deductibility
stature of a moral obligation? The categories of gift and obligation seem to be
mutually exclusive. Do businesses ordinarly make gifts to employees without some
degree of obligation either to the decedent or perhaps to serve the morale of other
employees? If the obligation is not legally binding, is it really necessary? Ought not
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to the possession of a successor.41 Income which originated
from the property after death is not taxable under section
691 of the Internal Revenue Code, but under the general
income sections of the code.42
(3) Whether untaxed income based on capital transactions mainly
attributable to the decedent's property will be taxed or not
depends on whether the decedent himself set in motion the
event which generated the imposition of the tax.43 Thus
the unpaid capital gains tax on a completed installment sale
is certainly taxable to the successor.44 Mere accretion of
voluntary gift disbursements fall into the rule of the Welch case especially when the
employer is often motivated to help the recipient at the expense of the government?
Isn't this gift reasoning even more persuasive when the corporate employer is controlled
by the same family as the recipient?
The solution to the Reed type disputes may lie in a challenge from the government
with increased vigor as to whether a voluntary payment satisfies the ordinary and
necessary tests required to sustain the employer's deduction. The service may have al-
ready laid the legal groundwork for this attack on the empoyer's position. Pomeroy,
"Insurance and Other Fringe Benefits," 29 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 197, 220 (1960). If an
employer acknowledges an obligation in order to get the deduction, it will automatically
create taxability of the recipient based upon the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 691(a).
Perhaps the threat of another final death blow inheres in the innocuous rule that
gift tax liabilities will be assessed against shareholders for gifts made by a corporation.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (1) (1959). If death payments in the form of gifts by the
corporation are not deductible by the employer, and if they be gifts by the shareholders,
can they not also be assessed as dividends to the shareholders? If corporate funds were
to be distributed to shareholders and by them in turn given to a widow by the share-
holders directly, two taxes would result: first, the dividend would be taxed as ordinary
income when the funds are paid out by the corporation. Secondly, the transfer to the
widow would be taxable as a gift. Ought the result be any different when the same
effect is reached indirectly by direct payment by the corporation? Far from being a
double victory, if this conclusion were to be accepted by the courts, the outcome would
be instead a double defeat! To extend the possibility to the ultimate, perhaps the pay-
ment could result in an effective triple tax: the corporation might get no deduction;
the shareholder might be taxed also having received a dividend; and the recipient or
the shareholder might be held to a gift tax! As yet we have seen no patterns which
support this astonishing possibility.
41 See table 3-2 at 356, items (n) through (y).
42 Mandel v. Sturr, 266 F.2d 321, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1323, 59-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9443
(2d Cir. 1959). The significance of the distinction can lie in whether an income tax
deduction for an estate tax payment is available.
43 See table 3-3 at 357, items (aa) through (gg).
44 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(a) (4) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-(5) (1957) ; similarly
if a profit results from a sale made by a successor before the death of the prior owner,
the gain is taxable notwithstanding that this stepped up value is included in the de-
cedent's estate as a gift in contemplation of death. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 1014(a) ordinarily steps up basis at death, thereby effectively eliminating income tax
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property value does not generate taxable income in respect
of decedent4 5 even though there was a binding contract
fixing its value. Thus the principal source of this loophole
seems to be the basis provisions of section 1014 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.
Notions of tax equity applied to seek out otherwise untaxed
income must observe the congruent limitation that no extra tax ought
to be created by death. This correlative requires that comparable ef-
fective tax rate categories be applied. The statute states this result
explicitly.47 The nature of income is carried across to the decedent's
successors. 8 The spread-back right to reduce bunched income by
modifying the effective tax rates also applies.4 9 For this same reason,
the non-taxable character of an involuntary conversion reinvestment
transfers from the decedent to his successor.50
Searching out decedent's untaxed income leaves another problem
for solution: the inquiry as to the taxable person and the taxable
periods must be resolved. The taxable income falls on the person who
has a right to receive it. 1 Thus the trichotomy of devolution patterns
re-enters to determine the taxable person. 2 The executor is usually
liable to pay the tax on probate estate income." The heir in Ohio
on the proceeds except where the property was "sold, exchanged or otherwise disposed
of before the decedent's death by such person . . ." who acquires the property from a
decedent.
45 Estate of Tom L. Burnett, supra note 34.
16 See supra note 36.
47 Capital gain is specially treated under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(a)(3).
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-3(b)(1) (1957); Comm'r v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406, 28 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 1349, 42-1 U.S.T.C. U 9330 (2d Cir. 1942); similarly as to non taxable in-
terest on government obligations see Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a) -3(b) (2) (1957). See also
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 642(h), 652 and 662.
48 Consider by analogy Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6, 42 Am. Fed. Tax R. 649,
52-2 U.S.T.C. U 9527 (1952) (expenditures by corporation shareholders after dissolution
are capital losses to correspond with the capital gain treatment when the proceeds were
received); Comm'r v. Hopkinson, supra note 47 and United States v. Benedict, 338 U.S.
692, 38 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1208, 50-1 U.S.T.C. U 9179 (1950) (charitable contribution by
trust limited to capital gain half includible).
40 Estate of O'Daniel v. Comm'r, supra note 32; Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-3(b)(3)
(1957).
50 Estate of Goodman v. Comm'r, 199 F.2d 895, 42 Am. Fed. Tax R. 877, 52-2
U.S.T.C. U 9556 (3d Cir. 1952), followed by Rev. Rul. 58-407, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 404.
51 Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R. 834 (1934).
52 Unjustified allocation of income and expense between estate and beneficiary is
subject to reallocation under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 482. Davis v. United
States, 282 F.2d 623, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5599 (10th Cir. 1960).
53 Randolph v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 472, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1152, 35-1 U.S.T.C.
U 9169 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 599 (1935). For a fine discussion of these princi-
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is ordinarily liable for the tax on his real estate,54 but not where the
estate has various rights amounting to ownership. 5 This is illustrated
by an allocation ruling: after the estate retakes realty to pay debts,
the income tax is apportioned between the heirs and the estate accord-
ing to the amount used to discharge the obligation and the funds
returned to the heir.56
Once the legal right to receive income in respect of a decedent
has devolved, it cannot be sold or given away57 except at the price
of precipitating the unpaid income tax liability on all of the decedent's
untaxed income. 58 The only non-taxable method of transfering preg-
nant property short of income taxability is by transmission at death, 59
which makes it thereby subject to the federal estate tax. If income
pregnant property is transfered by the estate to satisfy a pecuniary
legacy, the estate realizes taxable income in respect of the decedent.60
It can be effectively deflected by a gift to charity as a result of a
testamentary direction to this effect through the interaction of the
corresponding offset which results from the charitable deduction.6'
pies, see especially Miller, "Federal Income Tax Problems in Probate Practice," 3 Tax
Counsellors Quarterly 63 (1959), 43 Iowa L. Rev. 337 (1958); Hull, "Federal Taxation
of Income From Decedent's Estates," 3 Tax Counsellors Quarterly 41 (1959); see also
Lauritzen, "Estate Income During Administration-Who Owns It-Who Pays the Tax-
What to Do About It?" 3 Tax Counsellors Quarterly 1 (1959).
54 Overturf v. Dougan, 29 Ohio St. 230 (1877); "Death & Taxes I," supra note 20;
I.T. 1596, 11-1 Cum. Bull. 130 (1923) ; Abbot v. Welch, 31 F. Supp. 369, 24 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 563, 40-1 U.S.T.C. if 9245 (D. Mass. 1940). Does the new Ohio permissive real estate
management statute produce a different result? Ohio Rev. Code § 2113.311 (1959).
Consider a will provision to remove the descent to heirs premise. Sam S. Brown, 20
T.C. 73 (1953), acq., 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 3; see infra note 55.
55 Jones v. Whittington, 194 F.2d 812, 41 Am. Fed. Tax R. 864, 52-1 U.S.T.C.
ff 9203 (10th Cir. 1952) ; compare Estate of B. Brasley Cohen, 8 T.C. 784 (1947) (realty
under California law); Rev. Rul. 57-133, 1957-1 'Cum. Bull. 200; Rev. Rul. 58-69, 1958-1
Cum. Bull. 254; Rev. Rul. 59-154, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 160. See "Death & Taxes I," supra
note 20.
56 Rev. Rul. 59-375, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 161.
57 Robert E. Cleary, 34 T.C. 728 (1960); you can't duck the income tax on preg-
nant property by giving it away! Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4(a) (1957); see also Irwin
v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R. 5380, 1 U.S.T.C. if 132 (1925).
58 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4(a) (1957).
59 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4(b) (1957).
60 Comm'r v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1067, 48-1 U.S.T.C.
if 9296 (2d Cir. 1948); Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 198 and Rev. Rul. 55-117,
1955-1 Cum. Bull. 233.
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-1 (1956); Estate of Clymer v. Comm'r, 221 F.2d 680,
47 Am. Fed. Tax R. 729, 55-1 U.S.T.C. if 9418 (3d Cir. 1955); Drye, "Testamentary




CARRYING TO SUCCESSORS THE BENEFIT OF DEDUCTIONS UNUSED
BY THE DECEDENT DURING HIS LiFETIME
Taxing untaxed income to the decedent's successors produces its
equitable correlative: if the decedent had income tax deductions unused
during his lifetime, his successors ought later to get the benefit of these.
This is the policy behind section 691 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Deductions are allowed for business expenses, interest, taxes and for
non-business expenses and for the foreign tax credit. 2 A similar deduc-
tion for depletion is allowed to the income recipient.63 Except for this
limitation, the deductions generally descend to successors irrespective
of whether there be income in respect of the decedent in the person
entitled to the deduction.6 4 Thus, it appears that a deduction would
be allowable for interest paid by the beneficiary of an insurance
policy out of which an unpaid loan was satisfied after death.65
Of recurring interest is the continual problem of decedents' un-
paid Ohio real estate tax liens: the tax becomes a lien on January
1st of each year66 but is not collected until about fifteen to twenty
months later in many Ohio counties.67 Most Ohio decedents owning
real estate die with at least two half-liens outstanding; many will owe
three half-liens, and some will owe four, depending upon the time
of year during which death occurs, and the promptness of the collec-
tion machinery. These liens are chargeable against the corpus of the
estate as effective tax deductions quite without regard to the normal
time of payment.6s They are also deductions in respect of the dece-
dent," available to the heir in the absence of the decedent's contrary
testamentary direction.70
Deductions in respect of the decedent have their permissible
counterpart in a corresponding deduction for estate tax purposes.
62 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(b)(1).
63 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.691(b)-1(b) (1957).
64 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(b)-l(a) (1957).
65 Consider Estate of Pat E. Hooks, 22 T.C. 502 (1954), acq., 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 5,
which is possibly distinguishable. Compare J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. No. 113 (1961).
66 Ohio Rev. Code § 5719.01 (1953). Collection dates are fixed by law at December
20 and June 20 of the following year. Ohio Rev. Code § 323.12 (1953); see Ohio Rev.
Code §§ 5719.17 and 5719.18 (1953).
67 See Boehm, "Ohio Real Estate Tax Liens: Their Federal Tax Consequences,"
27 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 372 (1958) for a documented discussion. See also infra note 76.
6 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(b) (1958); Estate of Theresa Seagrist, 42 B.T.A. 1159
(1941).
69 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(b).
70 Ohio Rev. Code § 2113.52 (1953) requires the heir to pay all real estate tax liens
in the absence of a contrary testamentary direction. This would mean that the heir
to Ohio realty gets the deduction in respect of the decedent under Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, § 691(b). See also Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5719.24, 5719.25 and 5719.26 (1953).
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Duplications of these deductions are permissible. 1 This is not an
unintended benefit 72 but is an inevitable result of this comprehensive
settlement-just-before-death reasoning.73 The decedent's unused capital
loss carry-overs seem to be one missing item which goes unused under
any theory.74
RECOGNITION OF EXPENDITURES AND DEDUCTIONS TO DETERMINE
INTERRELATED FEDERAL INCOME AND ESTATE TAXES
We have seen that tax policy has set out to protect the federal
revenues by scooping up post-mortem taxes on taxable income, pre-
viously missed as to the decedent, and that it seeks to assess an estate
tax on the devolution of the property value of the income rights. In
applying both objectives, one simple equitable corollary needs atten-
tion:
If the decedent had collected all his income the night before he
died, had prepared his tax returns and had paid all his bills,75
what would he have had on deposit in a bank at his death as a
result? On this net amount only ought tax be levied on his estate.
This comprehensive settlement inquiry lies at the heart of a
simple philosophy from which can be understood the allowance of
estate tax deductions for claims against the estate, tax liens, 76 in-
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2053.
72 See Cox, "Executors Election to Claim Certain Deductions for Income or Estate
Tax Purposes," 20 Ohio St. L.. 23 (1959) and Frank, "Double Deductions-A Little
Labyrinth," 32 Taxes 473 (1954).
73 The concept has spawned an impressive group of secondary authorities: Craven,
"Taxation of Income of Decedents," 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 185 (1953) ; Drye, "The Taxation
of a Decedents Income," 8 Tax L. Rev. 201 (1953) ; Irell, "Income In Respect of Dece-
dents as Affected by the 1954 Internal Revenue Code," 1955 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 535
(1955); Kennedy, "Income Tax Problems of Decedents and Their Estates," 48 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 36 (1953); Krieg & Buschmann, "Section 126: Items of Gross Income In
Respect of a Decedent," 32 Taxes 651 (1954); Louthan, "Income In Respect of Dece-
dents," 96 Trusts & Estates 236 (1957); Spaulding, "Limitations of Income In Respect
of a Decedent," 18 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax. 1159 (1960) ; Windhorst, "Income In Respect
of a Decedent," 37 Taxes 1082 (1959); Wright, "Taxation of Income In Respect of a
Decedent," 31 Neb. L. Rev. 522 (1952) ; Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1024 (1952).
74 Rev. Rul. 54-207, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 147.
75 This simplified statement overlooks the tax rate problem which inheres in the
possibility of bunching of income. In the form in which this query is stated, the sum-
mary has been simplified to ignore the rate factor. This aspect of the problem has been
treated in a different context in the text at infra note 113.
76 Real estate tax liens accrued at the date of death enforceable either in personam
against the decedent or in rem against includible property are proper deductions for
estate tax purposes under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2053(a)4. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2053-6(b) (1958); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.691(b)-1(a) (1957), quoted in part at
infra note 78. Since Ohio real estate taxes accrue in rem on January 1 of each year
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debtedness and other deductions77 unused before the date of death.
Had all of these obligations been satisfied by payment before death,
cash would have declined by the amount actually paid out to satisfy
the claims. Thus, the estate tax deduction for debts and expenses
serves to reduce the gross estate to the correct amount of the net
estate passing.
That these items should also be deductible to the estate for
income tax purposes is simply a second correlative result of this
suggested comprehensive settlement-just-before-death reasoning: since
all income must be taxed in some way regardless of death, all deduc-
tions ought to be allowed as income tax deductions at the time of
payment after death much as they would have been deductible
had they been satisfied before death. Payment of debts which included
disbursements for deductible expenses would have produced for the
decedent some reduction in income taxes in the return for the period
when they were paid.7" The double deduction, fully justified in reason,
is therefore explicitly allowed by established Treasury policy79 as
the only reasonable result attending devolution of the decedent's
property:
(1) A deduction for estate tax purposes reduces the net property
value of the taxable succession to the proper net amount which
would have passed and would have been taxable if the liabili-
ties had been paid during life.
under Ohio Revised Code § 5719.01 (1953), but are collected the following year, any
decedent will have at least two half-taxes, and perhaps three or four, outstanding at
death depending upon the time of his passing and whether the semi-annual collections
have been satisfied. For a full discussion see Boehm, op. cit. supra note 67.
77 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2053. Indebtedness includes enforceable personal
liability of the decedent. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958); Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-7
(1958). Thus a binding separation agreement enforceable under state law to leave
property to children is properly deductible for estate tax purposes as a claim against the
estate of the decedent. Beecher v. United States, 280 F.2d 202, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
6113 (3d Cir. 1960).
78 "If the decedent who reported income by use of the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method owned real property on which accrued taxes had become a lien, and if
such property passed directly to the heir of a decedent in a jurisdiction in which real
property does not become a part of a decedents estate, the heir, upon paying such taxes,
may take the same deduction under section 164 that would be allowed to the decedent
if, while alive, he had made such payment." Treas. Reg. § 1.691(b)-1(a) (1957).
70 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956): The alternative deduction requirement does not
apply to "deductions for taxes, interest, business expenses, and other items accrued at
the date of a decedent's death so that they are allowable as a deduction under section
2053 (a) (3) for estate tax purposes as claims against the estate and are also allowable
under section 691(b) as deductions in respect of a decedent for income tax pur-
poses. .. "
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(2) At the same time, some successor has the right to claim as an
income tax deduction when paid, the amount of indebtedness
unused by the decedent because of non-payment during his
lifetime. The expenditure is thereby made available for the
living successor to the original taxpayer as an income tax de-
duction in respect of the decedent.
Occurrences near the end of life may span both life and death;
a decedent's accrued medical expenses unpaid at death are the subject
of three-way alternatives quite unlike any other:
(1) they may be once deducted as a debt for estate tax purposes80
as effectively reducing the value passing to successor; or
(2) they may be alternatively deducted as expenses in the last
income tax return of the decedent as though they had been
satisfied before death if they were finally paid within one year
after death notwithstanding that the decedent was a cash basis
taxpayer; 81 or
(3) they may be alternatively deducted by the surviving spouse
in her income tax return for the year in which they were
actually paid.82
But these three possibilities are strictly exclusionary: they may be
deducted only once in total,8 3 although they may be broken into parts
with complete latitude. Thereby, they may be claimed in part for more
than one purpose 4 with the only overriding limitation that the total
deductions allowable cannot exceed the total amount paid. 5 The
medical alternative deduction rule produces one application in which
80 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2053(a)3; Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(d) (1958); Tate v.
O'Maley, 52 F. Supp. 834, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1185 (W.D. Pa. 1943); Estate of
McGugan, 47 B.TA. 658 (1942).
81 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(d)1; the option is not available as to a closed
year. Treas Reg. § 1.213-1(d)(1) (1960).
82 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)-(1)(c)(3) (1960).
83 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(d)2; Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(d)(2) (1960).
84 Consider whether Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956) can be read along with Treas.
Reg. § 1.213-1(d) (1960); compare also Rev. Rul. 59-32, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 245 which
holds that administration expenses not allowable for income tax purposes because they
are attributable to tax free income can be divided and claimed for estate tax purposes.
See also infra note 100.
85 The medical deduction is a very special dispensation with a minimum amount
based at 3% of adjusted gross income for a taxpayer and wife neither of whom reached
65 years of age in the taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(a) (2) (1960). The portion
below the 3% minimum can be used as an estate tax deduction under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, § 2053 (a) (3). The portion over the 3% minimum up to the
maximum amounts imposed by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 213(c) could
be used as an income tax deduction. The 3% rule may influence the choice as to which
income tax alternative is adopted under the authority of the two contrasting methods of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 213(d)(1) and 213(a). The possibility of a
choice to use the optional standard deduction may influence one of the other alterna-
tives. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 144(a). The statute does not permit the fiduciary to use
the medical deduction on his income tax return for the estate.
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superficially the settlement-before-death philosophy might seem not
to fit: possibly-to conjecture-this reasoning is still applicable be-
cause medical expenses are personal deductions which have no essen-
tial relation to the determination of taxable economic income. 6
Death necessarily creates peculiar expenditures based upon the
event itself. Funeral bills can be considered as the decedent's approxi-
mate counterpart to the personal expense of the living;87 from this
approach the basis for the rule that funeral expenses are not deductible
for income tax purposes can be understood.8" They are deductible
for estate tax purposes only89 presumably because they consume some
of the value of the succession which would otherwise pass to the next
generation.
After the decedent's obsequies, follows the problem of the
administration of his estate. Here again because succession values are
reduced, administration costs may be offset as an estate deduction 0
and similarly, perhaps for the same reason, losses and casualties "dur-
ing the settlement of estates" 91 are deductible for estate tax purposes.92
86 Consider the implications of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 62 as to
deductions made in order to determine gross income as in Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1976
(1948); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (1957) as contrasted with deductions to arrive at net
income. An election to claim the optional standard deduction excludes the right to
itemize medical deductions. Treas. Reg. § 1.141-1(a) (1957).
87 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 262.
88 Estate of Orville F. Yetter, 35 T.C. No. 82 (1961); Rev. Rul. 56-449 as revised,
1956-2 Cum. Bull. 180.
89 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2053(a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-2 (1958); Comm'r
v. Cardeza's Estate, 173 F.2d 19, 37 Am. Fed. Tax R. 986 (3d Cir. 1949). Even so, the
funeral expense deduction explicitly turns on local law. Blackburn v. United States, 6
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6146 (S.D. Ind. 1960). Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-2 (1958) permits de-
duction for the cost of a burial lot "either for the decedent or his family," but in any
event, the federal deduction standard is expressly made subject to local probate law. See
Rev. Rul. 57-530, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 621. Distinguish the priority problem here; some
funeral bills are preferred as to other creditors; the balance are general claims. Ohio
law grants priority to expenses of funeral direction of $500 and for other expenses as
approved by the probate court. Ohio Rev. Code § 2117.25(B) (1953). The same section
contemplates additional bills payable for the same purpose but denies payment priority.
By statute, the husband is entitled to reimbursement from the estate of his wife for
funeral expenses paid by him. Ohio Rev. Code § 2117.26 (1953). His common law
liability in his own right has not been modified. Lee v. Hempy, 35 Ohio App. 402, 172
N.E. 421 (1929); Note, 4 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 486 (1935); Note, 7 Ohio St. L.J. 472 (1941).
90 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2053(a)2, 2053(b) ; Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (1958);
for an excellent discussion see Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 331-37
(1956).
91 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2054; Treas. Reg. § 20.2054-1 (1958).
92 Casualty seems to mean about the same either under the estate tax deduction
Lyman v. Comm'r, 83 F.2d 811, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1197, 36-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9307 (1st
Cir. 1936) as under the income tax deduction provision in Internal Revenue Code of
1954, § 165(c)(3).
1961]
368 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
TABLE 4t
SnrGLE, OPnoNAL AND DUPLICATmnG INcom, DEDucnoNs AND CREDITs
FOR DECEDENTS, ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES
Last Estate Income Income
income tax tax tax References
tax return return return and
Nature of the return - of of comments
receipt or of Form fiduciary: bene- See key at bottom
expenditure decedent 706 Form 1041 ficiary of this page
Expenses of last ill- Alt Alt D/D: if IRC § 213(d)
ness paid within 1 to spouse IRC § 2053(a) (3)
year IRC § 213(a), (c)(2)
Funeral expenses 1 IRC § 2053 (a) (1)






Alimony obligations 1 See note a
Personal obligations of 1 IRC § 2053(a) (3)
the decedent deduct-
tible for income tax
purposes if he were
alive
a. The commuted value of an unpaid alimony obligation may be deductible as a
claim for estate tax purposes if it has been created by a binding court order, or if it
arose from more than a mere separation agreement. Regulations § 20.2053-4(b); Comm'r
v. Estate of Watson, 216 F.2d 941, 46 Am. FED. TAX R. 1115 (2d Cir. 1954); INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a) (3). See Cornick, How Divorce and Separation Affect Estate
Taxes, LAsSER's ESTATE TAX TECHNIQ ES, 67.
For income tax purposes, a divorced or separated wife is a beneficiary of the estate.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 682(b); see also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a) (17).
Under the 1939 Code, which seems the same as the present law for this purpose, the
additional fact that the estate was entitled to a deduction for the estate tax did not
prevent a distribution deduction for the fiduciaries' income tax return. Laughlin's Estate
v. Comm'r, 167 F.2d 828, 36 Am. FED. TAX R. 985 (9th Cir. 1948). The Treasury pub-
lished its lengthy agreement with the result in the Laughlin case. GCM 25999, 1949 CB-1,
116, 49 PH Fed. ff 76263.
Since the alimony was a distributable item to the wife, it will be includible in her
gross income as a beneficiary under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 662(a). Estate of Daniel
G. Reid, 15 T.C. 573 (1950), aff'd on other issues sub nom. Izrastzoff v. Comm'r, 193
F.2d 625, 41 Am. FED. TAx R. 630 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Daisy M. Twinam, 22 T.C. 83 (1954).
In effect, taken together these two rules seem to produce a deduction for both estate
and fiduciary but the result is diluted by the correlative taxability to the spouse as a
distributee under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 662(a).
KEY TO SYMBOLS:
1 Includible or deductible for purposes of one return only; no alternatives or
duplications are permissible.
D/D Duplicating deduction available for two returns.
Alt Alternative deduction which may be used for either one of two different pur-
poses; the governing statute is usually IRC § 642(g) unless covered under
another specified statutory limitation.
C/B Carried to a beneficiary. This item may be used as a carryover deduction or
inclusion if not previously used. Generally the beneficiary must carry the
burden to qualify under IRC § 642(h). It may also be available if he receives
income in respect of a decedent which must carry the correlative expenses
which invoke IRC § 691(b).




SINGLE, OPnoNAL AND DupLICAT=nG INCOm, DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS
FOR DECEDENTS, ESTATES AND BENEICIARIES
Last Estate Income Income
income tax tax tax
tax return return return
Nature of the return - of of References
receipt or of Form fiduciary: bene- and
expenditure decedent 706 Form 1041 ficiary comments


















tion of the estate





IRC § 2053; see
Rev Rul 57-78
for joint liabilities




C/B IRC § 1212;
IRC § 642(h) (1);
See note b
1 Regs § 20.2053-5
as limited in
scope
1 IRC § 2055
D/D D/D See note c
D/D D/D See note d
Alt Alt C/B* IRC § 2054;




1 C/B IRC § 162 if, etc.
IRC § 642(h) (1)
Rev. Ruling 61-20
D/D D/D C/B Included whenever
received: IRC
§ 691(a)
Alt taxable Alt C/B IRC § 454(a)
IRC § 691(a)
IRC § 2031(a)
b. Unused capital losses cannot be carried from the decedent to the estate or to
the beneficiaries. Revenue Ruling 54-207, 1954-1 CB 147, 1954 PH Fed. ff 76777; Jones
v. Whittington, 194 F.2d 812, 41 Am. FED. TAX R. 864 (10th Cir. 1952). The decedent's
property includible in the estate takes on a new basis. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 1014.
Capital losses sustained may be deducted by the estate or carried to the beneficiaries.
Regulations § 1.642(h)-1(b).
c. A charitable bequest out of income only is deductible for estate tax purposes to
the amount of the present value of the income dedicated to the charity. The disburse-
ment is deductible to the fiduciary against income. See Drye, Testamentary Gifts of
Income to Charity, 13 TAx L. Rxv. 49 (1957). The charitable deduction cannot be
carried over to the ultimate beneficiary. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 642(h) (2) ; § 642(c).
d. Whether losses in a hobby farm or business are deductible by the estate depends
upon whether the property is being liquidated or preserved, or whether it is being used
to serve a personal purpose of the beneficiaries. See Estate of Mortimer B. Fuller, 9 T.C.
1069 (1947) ; Baker, Income Tax Planning for Executors, 9 TAx L. REV. 281, 293 (1954).
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TABLE 4 (Continued)
SINGLE, OPTIoNAL AND DUPLICATING INCOME, DEDUCTIONS AND CREDrs
FOR DECEDENTS, ESTATES Am BENEmCIAuzs
Last Estate Income Income
income tax tax tax References
tax return return return and
Nature of the return - of of comments
receipt or of Form fiduciary: bene- See key at bottom
expenditure decedent 706 Form 1041 ficiary of this page
Deductions in respect D/D D/D C/B IRC § 2053(a) (4)
of a decedent
Interest on unpaid tax
obligations
Federal estate tax on
income in respect of
decedent


















Property taxes a lien
IRC § 691(b)
D/D D/D C/B IRC § 2053
IRC § 641(b)
IRC § 163
1 C/B IRC § 691(c)
on ratio basis
no no no no IRC § 2053(c) (1)
(B)
IRC § 691(c)
Alt(?) Alt(?) C/B(?) See note e
D/D (?) D/D(?) C/B(?)
Alt Alt C/B Usually taxable in-
come to fiduciary
Rev Rul 56-472
Alt Alt C/B IRC § 2053;
Regs § 1.212-1(i)
D/D D/D IRC § 2053(c) (1)(B)








D/D D/D C/B IRC § 2053(c) (1)
(B)
IRC § 691(b) (1)
(A)
e. Selling expense resulting from liquidation for estate administration reasons has
been held to be alternatively deductible against selling price to determine capital gain or
as an estate tax deduction. Revenue Ruling 56-43. But under pure income tax theory,
maybe it ought to be treated as an offset against selling price; under this plausible ap-
proach, it is not a deduction requiring alternative treatment. Pincus, Expenses of Sale
by Estates, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1004 (1956).
KEY TO SYMaBOLS:
1 Includible or deductible for purposes of one return only; no alternatives or
duplications are permissible.
D/D Duplicating deduction available for two returns.
Alt Alternative deduction which may be used for either one of two different pur-
poses; the governing statute is usually IRC § 642(g) unless covered under
another specified statutory limitation.
C/B Carried to a beneficiary. This item may be used as a carryover deduction or
inclusion if not previously used. Generally the beneficiary must carry the
burden to qualify under IRC § 642(h). It may also be available if he receives
income in respect of a decedent which must carry the correlative expenses




SINGLE, OPTIONAL AND DUPLICATING INCOME, DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS
FOR DECEDENTS, ESTATES AND BENEFIC.AILES
Last Estate Income Income
income tax tax tax
tax return return return
Nature of the return - of of References
receipt or of Form fiduciary: bene- and
expenditure decedent 706 Form 1041 ficiary comments
Taxes on property D/D D/D C/B See note f
passing directly to IRC § 691(b) (1)




Dividends credit 1 C/B IRC § 642(h) (2)
Decedent's state death credit only IRC § 2011
tax
Depreciation and 1 C/B IRC § 691(b) (2)
depletion
Amortization of grain 1 Not available to
storage facilities successors
Rev Ruling 58-191
Distributions to bene- 1 C/B IRC § 661; § 662
ficiaries from corpus income They retain same
or income of estate as nature
distributees
f. Taxes accrued before death on property which passes directly to the heirs are
not a charge against the decedents estate under Ohio law; they follow the property and
the heir or devisee assumes the burden. Onio REv. CODE § 2113.53(F) (1953). If the
fiduciary pays the taxes out of the estate on behalf of the beneficiaries, not being re-
quired to do so, he is entitled to a deduction for distributed net income. The heir is
charged with distributable net income under INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 662(a); and at
the same time gets a deduction for taxes paid. But if the will forces the fiduciary to pay
the taxes, the tax is deductible by the estate under Ir. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 691(b).
Revenue Ruidng 58-69, 1958-1 CB 254, 58 PH Fed. 11 54783. The taxes are deductible for
estate tax purposes. INr. REv. CODE or 1954, § 2053(a) (3).
By contrast, an estate is a federal taxable entity" which has its
own income and expenses; all deductions generally allowable for
income tax purposes are available to it.94  Thus administration
expenses, 5 losses and casualties 6 are also available as deductions
03 The term "estate" as used in the federal taxing statute has been judically con-
strued to have been used in its ordinary sense. Laughlin Estate v. Comm'r, 167 F.2d
823, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 985, 48-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9263 (9th Cir. 1948). But it will be treated
as though it had been terminated earlier under federal standards if it is unreasonably
prolonged even though the state courts have not done so. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3
(1959); 6 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 36.47 (1957).
94 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 641(b); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.641(a)-2, 1.641(b)-i (1956).
05 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(i) (1957) provides that "[r]easonable amounts paid or
incurred by the fiduciary of an estate or trust on account of administration expenses,
including fiduciaries' fees and expenses of litigation, which are ordinary and necessary
in connection with the performance of the duties of administration are deductible under
section 212, notwithstanding that the estate or trust is not engaged in trade or business,
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for income tax purposes. 7 Since these are not operating deductions,
they are available only for the alternative election" although here
again, like the medical deduction, 9 they may be alternatively claimed
in either estate or income tax returns with full freedom to deflect and
sub-divide between the returns.00 But the costs of running the dece-
dent's house for his relatives are not administration expenses.10 1 Ex-
ecutor's fees and commissions can operate approximately like an
optional deduction but for different reasons. Fixed and determinable
commissions are prescribed by Ohio statute0 2 and extraordinary fees
may be granted by the supervising probate court.1 3 Once allowed,
except to the extent that such expenses are allocable to the production or collection
of tax-exempt income. But see section 642(g) and the regulations thereunder for disal-
lowance of such deductions to an estate where such items are allowed as a deduction
under section 2053 or 2054 in computing the net estate subject to the estate tax."
90 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(c) (1960): "Loss sustained by an estate. A casualty loss
of property not connected with a trade or business and not incurred in any transaction
entered into for profit which is sustained during the settlement of an estate shall be
allowed as a deduction under sections 165(a) and 641(b) in computing the taxable
income of the estate if the loss has not been allowed under section 2054 in computing
the taxable estate of the decedent and if the statement has been filed in accordance
with § 1.642(g)-i. See § 165(c)(3)." Rev. Rul. 55-190, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 275.
97 As to Ohio inheritance taxes, the Cuyahoga Probate Court has held that de-
ductions used for federal income tax purposes cannot be claimed for the inheritance
tax calculation. In re Estate of Kilroy, Cuyahoga Probate, # 551245 (1960), 5 Danaher,
Developments in Ohio Probate and Inheritance Tax Law 31 (1961). In accord is In re
Estate of Fleisher, Clark Probate, # 38189 (1959), 4 Danaher supra, at 46 (1960). The
contrary position was adopted by In re Estate of Havens, Lake Probate (Docket 32,
page 6] (1959), 4 Danaher supra, at 46 (1960).
98 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 642(g).
99 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(d) 2; see supra notes 80-82.
100 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956). Some expenses are not deductible for income
tax purposes because they are attributable to tax free income, George N. Meissner, 8
T.C. 780 (1947). In this situation, the nondeductible portion may be claimed as an
estate tax deduction under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2053. Rev. Rul. 59-32,
1959-1 Cum. Bull. 245; Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956); see also I.T. 4048, 1951-1
Cum. Bull. 39; Rev. Rul. 240, 1953-2 Cum. Bull 81.
101 Rev. Rul. 56-604, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 601; Sterling & Miller, "Taxable Incidence
of Rent Free Occupancy," 34 Taxes 759 (1956).
102 Ohio Rev. Code § 2113.35 (1953) provides that the following fees "shall be





Fees are allowable on all above
$5,000 at the rate of 2%
103 Ohio Rev. Code § 2113.36 (1953).
[Vol. 22
DEATH AND TAXES-H
they are taxable income to the executor 0 4 under the doctrine of con-
structive receipt 1 5 even though they are paid at a later time.'
Furthermore, if the executor has not rejected the right to receive the
commissions' 017 or has claimed them as inheritance tax deductions, °8
the income is taxable to the individual.0 9 Of course the disbursement
could alternatively be an estate tax deduction."0 But if there is a
bequest in lieu of commissions it might not be taxable to the fiduciary
as income"' in which case it is not deductible to the estate." 2 Over-
looking the question of whether the same persons are concerned, the
locus of the executor's commissions deduction behaves just like an
alternative. All of the considerations which impel the choice between
the two alternatives arise in determining whether the executor's fee
should be claimed and allowed.
The composite application of many of those rules appears in
table 4 supra, which summarize a series of applications of these doc-
trines of discretionary and double deductions.
Another practical fact remains: if the hypothesized ante-mortem
settlement had been accomplished, net property values passing to
successors at the date of death would have been reduced correspond-
ingly by the amount of inter vivos income taxes paid. This assumption
unrealistically ignores the income tax rate problem which would cer-
tainly have arisen as the result of bunching of income." 3 The time
when income is finally reduced to possession affects the income tax
rate applied; and this effect is even more noticeable as more taxable
104 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a)(1).
105 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957).
106 Comm'r v. Ross, 169 F.2d 483, 37 Am. Fed. Tax R. 193, 48-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9341
(Ist Cir. 1948); Nangle v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 900, 50 Am. Fed. Tax R. 854,
56-2 U.S.T.C. ff 10,024 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
107 Rev. Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 21; an executors waiver of his right to
commissions exercised before he is entitled to them is not a taxable gift.
108 Compare Rev. Rul. 56-472, supra note 107 as to this point.
109 If the bequest was bestowed on the condition that the executor perform the
services it is taxable income. Ream v. Bowers, 22 F.2d 465, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R. 7053,
1 U.S.T.C. ff 257 (2d Cir. 1927); Rose v. Grant, 39 F.2d 338, 8 Am. Fed. Tax R.
10496 (5th Cir. 1930).
110 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(b) (1958); Comn'r v. Bornson, 32 F.2d 112, 7 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 8686, 1 U.S.T.C. ff 379 (8th Cir. 1929).
111 Where the sole condition was qualification as executor, the payment was held
to be a gift and was thereby not taxable. United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 4
Am. Fed. Tax R. 3673, 1 U.S.T.C. ff 84 (1923); Bank of New York v. Helvering, 132
F.2d 773, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R. 684 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Rev. Rul. 57-398, 1957 Cum. Bull. 93.
112 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(b)(2) (1958).
113 Consider the court's dictum in Comm'r v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 45 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 1522, 54-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954), noted in
33 Taxes 675 (1955).
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persons are introduced by reason of devolution to proliferates follow-
ing the fact of death. To correctly fix the ultimate locus of the income
right so as to reduce the value of the succession by the amount of the
attendant income tax liability traced under section 691(a) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 would keep open for long periods of time
the determination of estate tax liability. This is an unacceptable result
since taxation is a practical matter." 4 For this good reason, estate tax
consequences cannot be directly adjusted as of the moment of death
to reflect the correct amount of income tax liability on the future
taxable income buried in income-pregnant assets. 115
To provide partial relief, an income tax deduction is granted for
the year in which the income was received for the proportion of the
estate tax cost-perhaps two or more costs" 6-- generated by the un-
taxed income included in the gross estate." 7 This method permits
closing the estate tax return by utilizing the inherent recurring flexi-
bility of the annual income tax return, and the flexibility of the
taxable person who receives the income right. The comparative in-
come tax cost of this treatment could never be the same as the income
tax debt which would follow from our assumed comprehensive settle-
ment before death. Only an approach to rough justice is possible by
effective reduction of the amount of taxable income to some successor
of the decedent" 8 through allowance of an often inadequate proportion-
ate offset based on the estate tax paid.119
"14 We have here applied as to a legislative policy decision the dictum of justices
Peckham, McReynolds, Sutherland and Black, "Death & Taxes I," supra note 1.
115 Income in respect of a decedent is taxed at full value in the estate unreduced
by the income tax imposed in effect by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 691(a).
Consider Hess v. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 104, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5638, 59-2 U.S.T.C.
II 9714 (3d Cir. 1959).
116 Two or more estate taxes can be used as income tax deductions on the same
item. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(c)-1(b), § 1.691(c)-1(d), example (2) (1957); Edna S.
Ullman, 34 T.C. No. 114 (1960).
117 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(c). Garrity, "Income in Respect of a Decedent,"
9 Kan. L. Rev. 40 (1960) is mostly concerned with the income tax deduction for estate
taxes paid on pregnant property.
118 The deduction operates in effect as a direct offset to the taxable income. "In-
come in respect of a decedent shall be included in the gross income for the taxable
year when received. . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a) -2(a) (1957). A deduction in
Tespect of a decedent is allowable when paid by the estate or where there is no
estate liability, when the successor acquires property subject to the lien of the
deductible expense. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(b)-l(a) (1957). The income tax deduction
follows the gross income inclusion above for its deductibility. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(c)-
1(a) (1957). Apparently it is allowable in addition to the optional standard deduction.
Compare the unavailability of the option under Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 142(b)(4) with Treas. Reg. § 1.691(c)-2 (1957).
119 Consider the halving effect on the income tax deduction for estate taxes paid
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The interrelationship of the two taxes can be simply stated: if
there be sufficient taxable income against which the income tax
deduction can be properly offset, it will usually produce tax economy
to waive estate tax deductibility where the choice is required. 20 This
summary of the utility of comparative deductibility between the two
taxes will many times require a consideration of the methods by
which the deductions are carried to various taxable persons.
COMPARING THiE RELATIVE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE DEDUCTIONS FOR
INCOME TAX AND ESTATE TAX PURPOSES
The comparative money cost of the alternative deductibles for
the income tax election as contrasted with the estate tax choice can
be reduced to two simple mathematical propositions :121
Where the maximum marital deduction is not available, assuming
sufficient offsetting otherwise taxable net income, in any net estate
up to $100,000 in value, it is always less expensive to use expenses
for income tax purposes than as estate tax deductions.
Where the facts indicate that income from the estate or its assets
will be taxable to some successor, we can intelligently determine the
comparative effective tax costs of the two methods. Any taxable
ordinary net income at all will be taxed at not less than 20 per cent."
The lower income tax brackets for estate and unmarried persons are
only $2,000 wide. At the lowest brackets, after exemptions on a deduc-
tion of $10,000 the average income tax saved to fiduciary or an un-
married person is at a rate of 26.4 per cent. In comparing the applicable
levy saved the tax structure particularly exempts any net which does
not exceed $60,000.123 Estate tax rates do not pass 20 per cent until
the taxable estate left after the exemption exceeds $40,000.124
These elements prove the $100,000 break-through proposition.
In many instances property of more than $100,000 in value will often
throw off enough income to force comparisons at rates in excess of
if the pregnant property passes under the marital deduction. Estate of Thomas A.
Desmond, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 889, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 833 (dictum); Rev. Rul.
55-225, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 460; Drye, "The Taxation of a Decedent's Income," 8 Tax
L. Rev. 201, 214 (1953); see also infra note 120.
120 See text infra from notes 121-44.
121 This section is a condensation of an earlier article, Boehm, "Comparing the
Relative Tax Costs of Alternative Treatment of Estate and Income Deductions and
Valuation Adjustments," 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 172 (1959), 9 Monthly Digest of Tax
Articles 55 (1959).
122 The dividends received credit which in effect reduces the applicable income tax
bracket by 4% is ignored. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 34.
123 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2052.
124 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2001.
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the minimum which was assumed. The breaking point comparison
would be raised accordingly.
Many cases will involve the additional element of the maximum
permissible marital deduction either by a formula or by excessive
qualification. In the full marital deduction case, the second thumb rule
can be stated with precision:
Where the maximum marital deduction is available in an estate,
assuming sufficient offsetting otherwise taxable net income, in any
full marital deduction estate up to $2,000,000, it is always less ex-
pensive taxwise to use expenses for income tax purposes in prefer-
ence to estate tax deductibility. In most estates, the breaking point
may easily pass $4,000,000.
Where the maximum permissible marital deduction is available,
as in a formula case, the elimination of an expense alternatively deduc-
tible increases the adjusted gross estate125 by the full amount trans-
ferred to the income return. As a correlative the potential marital
deduction is increased by one-half of the amount by which the ad-
justed gross estate has been increased through the elimination of the
deduction used for income offset. 126 The effect of the full marital
deduction 2 7 is to split into two halves the amount added to the
125 Adjusted gross estate is the statutory term which fixes the base from which the
maximum marital deduction is computed. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c)(2)(A).
The marital deduction shall not exceed 50% of the value of the adjusted gross estate.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c)(1). The entire value of the gross taxable estate
is reduced by the "deductions allowed by sections 2053 and 2054." Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 2056(c) (2) (A).
126 Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 386.
127 This discussion assumes a qualified marital succession which equals or exceeds
the maximum allowable marital deduction, as in the case of a marital succession which
over qualifies. Alternatively, a formula type marital deduction clause which may be
increased by operation of the election in order to produce the largest possible marital
deduction is assumed. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c) (1). For an example of a
formula type at work in the presence of alternative deductions, see Rev. Rul. 55-643,
1955-2 Cum. Bull 386. The deduction cannot exceed the value of all interests in
property which passed from the decedent to the surviving spouse to the extent that
the interest is included in the gross estate. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(a). The
use of the income tax alternative for deduction of expenses which otherwise attach to
the estate does not increase the dollar value of the qualified items which pass to the
surviving spouse. Rev. Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 460. See also infra note 136.
Stated in composite form, the transfer of alternative deductions out of the estate
tax computations increases the potential maximum marital deduction by increasing the
adjusted gross estate. Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 386. But the deduction
can't exceed the value of the specific items which pass to the spouse. The alternative
deduction does not change this fundamental factor. The double limitation still applies
the use of an optional deduction for other than estate tax purposes but does not increase
the marital deduction except where the permissible maximum is determined by reference
to the adjusted gross estate limitation. Conversely, if the applicable limitation is based
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estate tax base through the transfer of the deduction for income tax
use. One half increases the net taxable estate; the other is neutral since
it is offset by the increased maximum marital deduction. Against
the diminished amount after it has been halved by the marital deduc-
tion, the full ordinary estate tax rate would be applied.
Look at a variation of the equation: algebraically, if the dollar
amount of the deduction shifted from one tax base to the other is
left as a constant, the equivalent mathematical result can be produced
only by halving the applicable estate tax rate. In the presence of the
marital deduction it will be seen that the nominal rates in operation
are twice the actual effective rate. Stated inversely, where a full marital
deduction is available in an estate tax return, the estate tax cost of
waiving a deduction or of increasing a valuation is one-half of the
nominal effective rate.
To determine the significance of this proposition by comparison,
from inspection it can be seen that the nominal top estate tax rate
for a net estate of $2,000,000 is 45 per cent. In most marital deduction
cases of this size, a reduction factor of 5.6 per cent arises from the
allowable credit for state death taxes paid.28 Combining these two
elements into one stated factor, the resulting nominal net estate tax
rate is 39.4 per cent. Algebraically, to determine the actual effective
rate, it is necessary to divide by two the rate applicable to the trans-
ferred deduction because of the assumed presence of the maximum
marital deduction factor. This done, the effective estate tax cost on
an estate of $2,000,000 is 19.7 per cent which is applicable to the face
value of the items transferred for alternative use in the income tax
return.
This effective estate tax rate having been deduced to be 19.7 per
cent, the minimum income tax rate never can be less than 20 per cent
in the presence of taxable ordinary net income assumed to be sufficient
to support the amount of the deduction transferred under the optional
treatment. Quod erat demonstrandum. The following rule of thumb
can therefore be confidently applied:
In any full marital deduction estate which does not exceed $2,000,-
000, it is a mathematical certainty that instead of being used for
estate tax purposes a deduction can be taken more economically
upon the amount of the inheritance, the algebraic halving of rates is not effective and
the thumb rule applicable is the simple statement which assumes no marital deduction
at all. See infra note 136.
128 To determine the rate of the credit for state death taxes paid, the marital
deduction effectively halves the estate brackets applicable. The assumed two million
dollar estate is thereby cut to one million. The rate of the maximum allowable credit
for an estate between $840,000 and $1,040,000 is 5.67. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 2011(b).
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in a related income tax return if there is sufficient otherwise taxable
ordinary net income to use up the amounts transferred under the
alternative.
Even this thumb rule probably does not say enough. It is a
reasonable guess that in most cases involving estates of at least $2,000,-
000 in taxable value, it is reasonable to expect to find significant
amounts of taxable income which might probably effectively invoke
income tax brackets of several times the minimum income tax of 20 per
cent which has been used as a point of departure in this analysis.
Extrapolated further, a deduction lost by an estate of $4,000,000 will
generate an effective estate tax of only a little over 25 per cent.
Remembering the probabilities of taxable income which seem likely
to follow from large aggregations of wealth, it will be an uncommon
situation indeed where it is not wise to adopt the income alternative.
This reasoning will fit a choice whether to waive fiduciary fees" 9
and a proposal to increase fair market values in the gross estate30
when the boost will raise the basis for depreciation under sections 1014
and 167(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. A stated amount
of estate valuation increase will produce additional net taxable estate
by only 50 per cent because the maximum marital deduction will
consume the other half. The depreciation base for the ordinary income
tax deduction for depreciation by the fiduciary or the beneficiaries
will go up by the full amount of the increased valuation.' Likewise
129 Where an executor's commmission is paid as compensation, it is taxable income
to him. If the fiduciary is also the beneficiary, terminology may mean the difference
between paying an income tax on the fee and saving an estate tax on a legacy in an
identical amount. In this case, the same monetary alternative is cast in a different legal
form.
If accomplished by will a legacy to an executor may avoid income tax if it does
not require him to do more than qualify as a condition to receiving the legacy. United
States v. Merriam, supra note 111; Rev. Rul. 57-398, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 93. A similar
result may be accomplished by a timely and unequivocal waiver by the fiduciary. Rev.
Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 21. While avoiding income tax, this alternative increases
the taxable estate and boosts the estate tax on the succession as increased by the fee
waived by the fiduciary.
130 This issue could come up in a dispute with the Internal Revenue Service over
the appropriate fair market value of a decedent's includible real estate. Or it could
come up in deciding whether to elect to use the optional valuation date under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2032; the valuation option is available as a matter
of right in any estate in excess of $60,000 whether values have decreased or increased.
Rev. Rul. 55-333, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 449; Rev. Rul. 56-60, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 443.
131 One conceivable limited objection has been laid to rest; the Treasury has ruled
that the election to transfer administration expenses to the income tax return does not
reduce the limited amounts which may receive special non-dividend treatment as dis-
tributions in redemption of stock in a closely held corporation. The funds bailed out
can be used to the full amount used for succession taxes and funeral expenses. Ad-
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it illustrates why income pregnant property ought not to be passed to
the widow as an element in the marital deduction if another alternative
can be included.132
The chargeable burden of the estate and inheritance taxes133 may
reduce the amount passing to the widow134 to less than the maximum
permissible deduction. 3" This is obviously not a true case of an
allowable maximum.136  The calculation will fall under thumb rule
no. 1. Granted a will where the property which actually passes to the
surviving spouse will reach or exceed the 50 per cent maximum allow-
able, when deductions are transferred for alternative income tax treat-
ment, the amount of the marital deduction will permissibly increase ac-
cordingly.137 This will also mean by its terms that the spouse will
receive a preference through the reduced charge against her share if
ministration expenses may be deducted under the alternative income tax treatment
without affecting the right to claim the special tax treatment. The permissive redemp-
tion statute allows a partial distribution to the extent of all stated expenditures allow-
able as a deduction under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 303(a), 2053; Rev.
Rul. 56-449, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 180.
132 The presence of the maximum marital deduction reduces the effective estate
tax to 50% levied on the taxable succession. When the income pregnant property passes
to the widow, the effective tax reduction is reduced so that the income tax deduction
for the estate tax paid is diminished. See citations at supra note 119; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.691(c)-1(d)(2) (1957).
133 The widow's share will be reduced by the burden of Ohio inheritance and
federal estate taxes unless the will has provided otherwise. Campbell v. Lloyd, 162
Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 911 (1955); Estate of Rose
G. Jaeger, 27 T.C. 863 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 252 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1958).
134 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(4); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(c) (1958).
135 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c)(1).
136 Two recent cases which involve the effect of the alternative deduction of expenses
on the computation of the marital deduction [Estate of Roney, 33 T.C. 801 (1960)]
and the charitable deduction [Estate of Luehrman v. Comm'r, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
145545 (8th Cir. 1961), affirming 33 T.C. 277 (1960), noted in 7 U.C.LA.L. Rev.
553 (1960)] affect the computation of the amount passing to the surviving spouse.
The amount of the maximum marital deduction is fixed at 50% of the adjusted gross
estate by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2056(c) (1); but there is no maximum
for the charitable deduction. But the other limitation shared in common by both
marital and charitable deduction definitions is fixed at the "value of any interest in
property which passes or has passed to his surviving spouse" or to charity out of the
gross estate. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2055(a) and 2056(a). Both Roney and Luehrman
dealt with the amount passing: thus the expenses paid out of the estate but charged to the
income tax return do not necessarily increase the amount of property passing to the
spouse or to the charity out of the residue. For that reason, these cases held that the
two respective deductions are not increased. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (4).
See also supra note 127.
137 Rev. Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 Cum. Bull 460; Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-1 Cum. Bull.
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the income tax alternative is elected. 38 To elect this method may set
up choices by the executor in favor of the widow as against other heirs
or remaindermen.' 39 The presence of a preference may indicate the
wisdom of a will provision which authorizes full discretion in electing
between the alternatives and requires no contribution to adjust for
the preference.140
There is little administrative burden in claiming the benefit of the
alternative deductions. To justify allowance of the deductions for
income tax purposes, the executor must file in duplicate a statement
to the effect that the items have not been allowed as estate tax
deductions. The statement must include a waiver of the right to claim
the deductions for estate tax purposes. 141 It may be filed at any time
138 The preferences to the widow will result from the decrease in the expenses
otherwise chargeable against her share and by the resulting increase in the income
earned. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2056(b) (5), 2056(b) (6). See a detailed explanation
and a table illustrating the application of this problem by Polasky, "Estate Tax Marital
Deduction In Estate Planning," 3 Tax 'Counsellors Quarterly 1 (1959).
139 Using either tax alternative may shift property values from one beneficiary to
another. To transfer administration expenses to an income tax return increases the
estate tax which is levied on the corpus while it saves income taxes to the income bene-
ficiaries. In a good reported example, a will used a marital deduction formula type
clause. In re Levy's Estate, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957). The fiduciary used the
income tax alternative which saved federal income taxes but increased estate taxes
assessed against the corpus. The court required the income beneficiary to reimburse the
corpus for the estate tax cost created by the election used. Even so, the income bene-
ficiary was still ahead by the profit which resulted from the rate spread between the
two taxes. In effect, the tax tail wags the property dog; a choice for tax purposes
counters a property right which would ordinarily act in opposition. Which to choose?
The fiduciary ordinarily cannot prefer one beneficiary over another, and he is under
a duty to save taxes. These pulls and hauls have caused fiduciaries some anxious
moments. See In re Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 295 P.2d 68 (1956), noted in
4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 111 (1956); In re Warms Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955);
and as to a capital gain tax transferred between corpus and income, compare Rice
Estate, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 379 (Orphans' Ct. 1956). The best treatment of this emerging
problem appears in Gradwohl, "Current Issues In Probate Estate Income Tax Alloca-
tion," 37 Neb. L. Rev. 329 (1958). See also In re Estate of Inman, 22 Misc. 2d 573,
196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surr. Ct. 1959); and In re Estate of McFarnahan, N.Y.L.J. 13
(N.Y. Surr. Ct. April 25, 1960). See also the excellent collection of authorities by
Polasky, op. cit. supra note 138, at 11-17.
140 For a full suggested will provision to cover this point, see Polster, "Provisions
of Wills Affecting Estate Administration and Their Tax Consequences," 20 Ohio St.
L.J. 36, 41 (1959). Another short clause was suggested by Fleming, "Will Clauses to
Avoid Six Estate Administration Problems," 99 Trusts & Estates 624 (1960).
141 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-1 (1956) "Disallowance of Double Deductions; in General.
Amounts allowable under § 2053(a)(2) (relating to administration expenses) or under
§ 2054 (relating to losses during administration) as deductions in computing the taxable
estate of a decedent are not allowed as deductions in computing the taxable income
of the estate unless there is filed a statement, in duplicate, to the effect that the items
have not been allowed as deductions from the gross estate of the decedent under § 2053
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while the limitation period is open. 42 Even though a deduction has
been once claimed for estate tax purposes, at the price of paying the
resulting estate tax deficiency, it can still be claimed for income tax
purposes so long as the estate tax deduction has not been finally
allowed and the statement is filed. Once the statement for the estate
tax deduction has been filed, because of the waiver, it cannot later be
allowed.'43 A similar procedure is required for alternative deduction
of medical expenses. 44
These propositions demonstrate that almost all smaller estates
and many larger ones will probably justify the choice of the income
tax deduction alternative in preference to reducing the size of the net
taxable estate.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVICES TO DEFLECT TAXABLE INcOME AND
DEDUCTIONS OF DECEDENTS AND ESTATES AMONG SUCCESSOR
TAXABLE ENTITIES
In its application of varying doctrines of devolution, property
law has provided a complicated pattern for determining the entity to
which flows the right to income and the responsibility for its resulting
taxes. Congruently, it has assigned liability for the payment of
obligations and has conferred as a correlative the right to claim the
benefit of the unused deductibles. But the doctrines must work both
ways; entity doctrines frustrate economic equity if they do not
operatively permit corresponding tax benefit to those who bear the
economic burdens of succession and its incidents. This possibility
of injustice can be summarized in a general epigrammatic truism of
tax economics:
or § 2054 and that all rights to have such items allowed at any time as deductions
under § 2053 or § 2054 are waived. The statement should be filed with the return for
the year for which the items are claimed as deductions or with the district director of
internal revenue for the internal revenue district in which the return was filed, for asso-
ciation with the return. The statement may be filed at any time before the expiration of
the statutory period of limitation applicable to the taxable year for which the deduction
is sought."
142 Rev. Rul. 58-484, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 363.
143 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-i (1956).
144 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(d) (2) (1957): "The rule prescribed in subparagraph (1) of
this paragraph shall not apply where the amount so paid is allowable under § 2053 as
a deduction in computing the taxable estate of the decedent unless there is filed in
duplicate (i) a statement that such amount has not been allowed as a deduction under
§ 2053 in computing the taxable estate of the decedent and (ii) a waiver of the right
to have such amount allowed at any time as a deduction under § 2053. The statement
and waiver shall be filed with or for association with the return, amended return, or
claim for credit or refund for the decedent for any taxable year for which such an
amount is claimed as a deduction."
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An allowable exemption or deduction is always lost and is thereby
worthless unless there be available sufficient taxable net income to
support the use of the income tax deduction, or alternatively unless
there be a taxable net estate sufficient to consume the estate tax
deduction.
Thus, for example, when rigidly applied according to concept14 5
without regard to financial reality in an income tax return which taxes
at a higher rate or which shows less income than its permissible
deductions and exemptions, 140 the tax economy implicit in an allowable
income tax deduction is lost. Some relief results where the value can be
utilized for some other purpose such as for estate tax benefits147 or by
permitting it to be carried across to another taxable entity.14
The income and expense in respect of decedent 49 device contains
an inherently flexible solution to many of the problems of the taxable
entity. The concept runs across a wide selection of persons and
entities with ease: wherever income falls, in the estate of the deced-
ent,150 or to a non-probate successor, 151 or to a distributee of an
145 An estate fiduciary cannot personally deduct attorneys' fees and other ad-
ministration costs on his personal return; they may be deducted only by the estate.
Rev. Rul. 55-190, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 275. From a similar conceptual compartmentaliza-
tion, an estate tax deduction is disallowed for gift tax liability litigation costs when the
transferees were defending their own gift tax liability as to a 1952 death, Hoover v.
United States, 180 F. Supp. 601, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1848, 60-1 U.S.T.C. f[ 11,923
(Ct. Cl. 1960) although the effect of this decision may have been modified by the
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 212(3). Consider also Bonny-
man v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 625, 52 Am. Fed. Tax R. 948, 57-2 U.S.T.C. II 9938
(E.D. Tenn. 1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 835, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1958).
6 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 93, at §§ 36.18, 36.28.
146 Conscious attempts to deflect income thereby to avoid the extra cost resulting
from higher brackets (consider the examples suggested at supra note 63) can be com-
pared to a slightly more sophisticated device by which deductions are deflected to high
bracket tax payers to accomplish the same objective. Among a myriad of examples see
Farnsworth v. Comm'r, 270 F.2d 660, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5624, 59-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9705
(3d Cir. 1959); Coiston v. Burnet, 59 F.2d 687, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R. 606, 3 U.S.T.C.
[ 947 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 640 (1933); United States v. Shafto, 246 F.2d
338, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 870, 57-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9859 (4th Cir. 1957).
147 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 642(g), 2053, 2054.
148 The taxable entity approach is usually applied with rather technical overtones
to prevent jumping deductions from one taxpayer to another. See supra note 146; see
also as to officers salaries for corporate employers, Noland v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 108,
4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5031, 59-2 U.S.T.C. fI 9600 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885
(1959); Leedy-Glover Realty & Ins. Co., 13 T.C. 95 (1949), aff'd, 184 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.
1950).
149 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 691(a), 691(b).
150 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(a) (1) (A).
151 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 691(a)(1)(B), taxes income in respect
of a decedent to "the person who, by reason of the death of the decedent, acquires the
right to receive the amount, if the right to receive the amount is not acquired by the
[Vol. 22
DEATH AND TAXES-11
estate, 2 the income is taxable when received or deductible when the
obligations are paid' 3 Striding across the years and jumping onto
various taxable entities and persons at the same time, the method
seems very nearly free of the conceptual difficulties implied in the
taxable person question tied up in ordinary income tax law: To whom
was the income taxable?'54
In the administration of an estate, if income is once present and
taxable, " ' by applying the distributable net income concept, 5 6 income
can be held in the estate to produce tax or be deflected to transfer it.
Taxable income is transferred to beneficiaries by the distribution
processY.57  This permits conscious conduct flexibly designed solely
for tax economy. Conversely, it can produce a deflection of income
tax liability by accident or misinformation.' Distribution has its
decedent's estate from the decedent." Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), example (3) (1957)
illustrates this situation with pregnant survivorship government E bonds.
152 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(a)(1)(c) covers the distributee from an estate
if the income right was distributed. See Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), examples (1)
and (2) (1957).
353 The broad scope of the inclusion spelled out by the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, § 691(a), would seem to include all of the heirs and next of kin usually covered
by the statutes of descent and distribution. Suppose that a pregnant property arrange-
ment were effectively made payable to a remote third party, such as a paramour. This
broad code provision would surely hold any distributee liable for the income tax. Could
it be any different if the recipient were a paramour? Situations looking like this don't
seem to get into the reports. In a different connection, see Leon Turnipseed, 27 T.C.
758 (1957); and consider Hugh B. Monjar, 13 T.C. 587 (1949), acq., 1950-1 Cum.
Bull. 3.
154 The "to whom" question is at the heart of much federal income tax doctrine.
McCaughn v. Girard Trust Co., 19 F.2d 218, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R. 6687 (3d Cir. 1927).
155 See infra notes 156 and 158 developing the prime requisite that taxable income
must be present apart from the mechanical activity of administering and distributing the
estate.
156 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 643(a) reverses the result in Johnson v.
Helvering, 141 F.2d 20S, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R. 280, 44-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9215 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944) and McCullough v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d 345, 34 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 866, 46-1 U.S.T.C. f[ 9140 (2d Cir. 1946). See Davidson v. United States, 149 F.
Supp. 208, 50 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1948, 57-1 U.S.T.C. U 9462 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
157 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 661(a) grants a deduction to the estate
for all amounts distributed to the beneficiaries during the year up to the amount of the
distributable net income. The amounts so passed to the beneficiaries are taxed to them
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 662(a).
158 The distribution will carry taxable income to the beneficiaries dependent upon
(1) the presence of taxable income (2) the distribution of value and (3) the absence of
testamentary direction or equivalent legal devolution device included under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, § 663. Casner, "Tax Results of Interim Estate Distributions,"
98 Trusts & Estates 200 (1959). These circumstances deflect income regardless of intent
and whether or not a capital item was the basis of the value distributed. See supra note
156 and S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 346 (1954).
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own special meaning and effect. At the time local law or the governing
instrument requires a distribution, its fair market value is treated as
taxable income carried over to the successor as distributable net
income.'5 9 The same result follows from an indirect distribution6 ° or
when the distribution is accomplished without a specified require-
ment.16' The character of the income is preserved. 6 ' Since qualified
marital deduction trusts require that income must be distributed
annually or more frequently commencing not later than thirteen
months after death,' 63 it would seem that this requirement of property
rights passing or distributable to the widow would carry distributable
net income to her *under the requirement test. The distributions destroy
the right to use the estate's statutory deduction of $600164 if they
exceed the otherwise taxable income.' 65  The distributions are not
affected by the throw-back rule which applies only to trusts but not
to an estate. 166 Not all distributions out of the estate are treated as
taxable net income. Distributions of a specific sum of money or specific
property payable in not more than three instalments do not carry
income to the beneficiary. 167 Nor do payments to satisfy the widow's
159 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 661(a) (1).
160 An indirect distribution where assets are used to discharge a legal obligation
is also treated as distributable net income. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(d) (1956); Treas.
Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
161 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 661(a) (2). This seems comparable to a corporate
dividend which requires no tracing to carry income; the required presence of distributable
net income is the equivalent of corporate earnings and profiits. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 3316(2). This distribution also covers non specific capital distributions in kind. Treas.
Reg. § 1.662 (a) -3(b) (1956). Proposed legislation which was nearly enacted early in
1960 will change this result for most property distributions in kind within 3 years of
death. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), proposed § 663(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
162 The same character of income distributed or held is preserved whether it be
taxable in the estate or in the hands of beneficiaries. Treas. Reg. § 1.662(b)-i and 2
(1956). Capital gains and losses keep their nature. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 643 (a) (3) ;
so does the dividend exclusion, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 643 (a) (7) ; tax exempt interest,
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 643 (a) (5); and extraordinary dividends, Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 643(a) (4).
163 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-6(a)(2), 20.2056(b)-6(d) and 20.2056(b)-5(f)
(1958).
164 The statutory deduction of $600 permitted by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 642(b) is lost if there be no income to support it. The distributions may consume all
income under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 661(a). It would be economical tax wise
to withhold at least enough assets in any year to carry all deductions and the exemptions.
Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-2 (1956). Similarly as to the dividends received credit, see
Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-i (1956).
165 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 643(a).
166 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 665.
167 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 663.
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allowance"' s and the statutory exemption from administration 69 carry
income. 70 These amount in effect to a kind of statutory specific
legacy. No real estate which descends directly to heirs is treated as
having been distributed out of the estate. 17 ' This amounts in effect to
an approximate quasi-specific devise.
Distributable net income can be seen as a new idea built on top
of older concepts 1'7 2 designed to overcome the untaxed income problem
and to assign income tax responsibility to various entities according
to the nature of the income as it came to the estate. No correlative
deduction problem can arise because the only deflection possible
requires that distributable net income results only after all allowable
deductions have been offset against the gross income of the estateY.7 3
Since deductions first must be recognized, it is not possible to carry
income to any beneficiary unless there was net taxable income available
to the estate as a predicate. 4 The honorific tax personality ordinarily
recognized for estates1'75 for federal income tax purposes has been
168 The Ohio widows allowance is created under Ohio Rev. Code § 2117.20 (1953).
169 The variable statutory exemption of from $500 to $2500 is authorized under
Ohio Rev. Code § 2115.13 (1953).
170 Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-(2)(e) (1956).
171 Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-(2)(e) (1956).
172 "Ideas are inherently conservative. They yield not to the attack of other ideas,
but to the massive onslaught of circumstance with which they cannot contend. ....
Galbraith, The Affluent Society 20 (1958). Further: "The fatal blow to the conventional
wisdom comes when the conventional ideas fail signally to deal with some contingency
to which obsolescence has made them palpably inapplicable." Id. at 6.
173 Distributable net income as defined necessarily implies that all deductions have
been absorbed to determine income to determine the original starting point. But in
the final period of the return, an approximate cognate is present through the termination
deductions under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 642(h). See text at infra notes
176 and 18S.
174 Distributable net income is measured not only by the events of the taxable
year concerned but also by the events of later periods as they may reduce taxable
income through a net operating loss carryback. Rev. Rul. 61-20, 1961 Int. Rev. Bull.
No. 6, at 57 allows beneficiaries to claim refunds which arise out of an estate net operat-
ing loss carryback. The subsequent loss reduces income otherwise taxable to the estate
for the earlier year; thereby the distributable net income must be reduced accordingly.
The reduction to the estate correspondingly reduces income to the beneficiaries; the
reduction of taxable income from the estate to the beneficiary is the basis for the
refund. This result is peculiarly the product of the distributable net income concept
and is the reverse of the law as drawn from the prior code. Mellott v. United States,
257 F.2d 798, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5097 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958);
Sargent v. United States, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1696, 55-1 U.S.T.C. fI 9424 (S.D. Calif.
1955).
175 The term estate has been construed to have been used in its ordinary probate
sense. Laughlin Estate v. Comm'r, 167 F.2d 828, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R. 985, 48-1 U.S.T.C.
ff 9263 (9th Cir. 1948). But the duration of an estate will be determined according to
federal law independently of whether the state law permits it to continue. Treas. Reg.
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purposely eliminated in the year of termination of the estate. 76 In
the taxable period of termination, the fiduciary's "unused loss carry-
overs and excess deductions''177 are carried over to the beneficiaries of
the estate and are allowed as deductions to them. Thus the statute
permits the beneficiaries to claim an unused net operating loss carry-
over, 178 and an unused capital gain deduction 1 79 and an unused capital
loss carry-over directly out of the estate 8 0 but not from the decedent
himself.' With the narrow exception of soil and water conservation
expenditures unused by the estate,'8 2 all unusable deductions in excess
of gross income for the last taxable year of the estate can be carried
forward to the beneficiaries. The fact of termination is crucial. If the
estate is not wound up, or if unused non-operating loss deductions
originated in a different taxable year,183 they are not subject to carry-
over; in these cases, they are not deductible by the beneficiaries.
The lost deductions which originated in the last taxable year are
available to each beneficiary in proportion to his respective economic
burden'8 4 as a deduction either (1) to determine adjusted gross in-
come 8 5 or (2) to compute net taxable income, but only if the optional
§ 1.641(b)-3 (1960); see many cases collected at 6 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 93
§ 36.47.
176 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 642(h) reversed in a limited application the
line of cases which refused to permit deductions unused in administration to be carried
across to the beneficiaries.
177 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 642(h).
178 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-l(b) (1956).
179 Rev. Rul. 59-392, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 163; Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-I(a) (1956);
Somers, "New Ruling Preserves Benefit of Capital Gains Deduction on Termination," 12
Journal Taxation 137 (1960).
180 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-I(a), (b) (1956).
181 A capital loss carry-forward unused by the decedent dies with him; it cannot
be absorbed through the estate. Rev. Rul. 54-207, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 147. Nor is it
available to successors under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 691(b), nor through
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 642(h).
182 Because of the erratic and probably unintended method of statement in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 175, soil and water conservation expenditures not
consumed by the estate under the restrictive limitations of the statute are not available
to the beneficiaries under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 642(h), after termination.
Rev. Rul. 58-191, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 149.
183 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-i (1956) is confined to unused net operating loss carry-
over under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 172 and an unused capital loss carry-over
under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1212. Furthermore, the time for carry-over is
reduced by the fact that the year of the termination is counted in determining the carry-
over period.
184 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-3 and 4 (1956) contain a series of specific allocation
standards by which the benefit of the deductions are permitted to those who bear the
burden. See also Rev. Rul. 60-134, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 259.
185 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-1(b) (1956) ; this applies only to the net operating loss
carry-over and the capital loss carry-over.
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standard deduction is waived. 86 The waiver requirement depends
upon the underlying nature of the deduction as it is traced out of the
estate and carried to the successor's income tax return. If the item
was a net operating item, it is deductible independently of the option;
but if the deductions were not built on an operating loss8T then the
optional choice must be asserted and all deductions must be
itemized. 88
CONCLUSION
The application of these principles involve interrelated choices
between taxable persons and various taxing theories. They are in-
fluenced by the dimension of time, the realities of death and the facts
of receipt, payment or accrual. These relationships must deal with the
complexity of interlocking persons, natural and legalistic, the need for
doctrines of taxation which operate equitably and which at the same
time serve the needs of the public fisc.
The tax experts, [we are told], have done a magnificent job of
creating a morass into which any mere probate or trust lawyer must
fear to tread .... 189
That "taxation is an eminently practical matter" 90 is indisputable.
That it is a modern accretion to the historical doctrines of the law1
91
should be readily apparent even to him who reads while running.192
To combine "the plain purposes of a modern fiscal measure [with]
186 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 141. Of course, the standard deduction is never avail-
able to the estate. Treas. Reg. § 1.142-2 (1957).
187 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-2(a) (1956); the net income alternative computation
applies to all termination deductions except the capital loss and operating loss carry-overs.
See supra note 185.
188 See supra notes 185 and 187.
189 Sutter, "Simplification of Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts," Proceedings
of Probate and Trust Law Section, American Bar Ass'n., Miami, Florida, 1959, Irving
Trust Co. reprint 44.
190 Mr. Justice Peckham, Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 519, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2661
(1899); Mr. Justice McReynolds, Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S.
204, 8 Am. Fed. Tax R. 10257, 10259 (1930); Mr. Justice Sutherland, Tyler v. United
States, 281 U.S. 497, 503, 8 Am. Fed. Tax R. 10912, 2 U.S.T.C. ff 532 (1930); Mr.
Justice Black, United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 22 Am Fed. Tax R. 282 (1939).
191 "The foundations of Federal tax law all revolve around basic relationships
recognized by every day law. All the tax problems must pivot on legal concepts be-
cause they govern the transactions which create the taxable events. The basic concepts
underlying a tax system cannot change anymore than the legal system itself changes ......
Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income Gift & Estate Taxation, Report No. 225, "A Preface
to an Anniversary," Preface iii, passirn, April, 1961.
192 Habakuk 2:2 used the phrase "he who runs may read." This identical phrase
was used by Kalodner, J., without reference to its origin. Roebling v. Comm'r, 143
F.2d 810, 814, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1083, 44-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9388 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 773 (1944).
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the wholly unrelated origins of the recondite learning of ancient
property law"'193 will necessarily cause complications "in a field beset
with invisible boomerangs.' 9 4  "Orthodox principals have to be
trimmed and hauled to meet the unique necessities of the insatiable
tax gathering process." 95
The federal tax law is a spit compounded of fiscal necessity and
the desire to disturb existing patterns as little as possible. On it has
been skewered fifty differing local law versions of a trichotomy of
property devolution devices drawn from historical accidents. Out of
this amalgam, it seems inescapable that the morass be confused.
The real wonder is that it makes as much sense as it does.
193 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 23 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 1054, 1058, 40-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9208 (1940).
194 Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6, 42 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 649, 653, 52-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9527 (1952).
195 Judge Brown, Patchen v. Comm'r, 258 F.2d 544, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R. 5433,
5439, 58-2 U.S.T.C. f 9733 (5th Cir. 1958).
